United States v. Halper
490 U.S. 435 (1989)
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. . . .
In this case, we consider whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
Respondent Irwin Halper worked as manager of New City Medical Laboratories, Inc., a company which provided medical service in New York City for patients eligible for benefits under the federal Medicare program. In that capacity, Halper submitted to Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Greater New York, a fiscal intermediary for Medicare, 65 separate false claims for reimbursement for service rendered. Specifically, on 65 occasions during 1982 and 1983, Halper mischaracterized the medical service performed by New City, demanding reimbursement at the rate of $12 per claim when the actual service rendered entitled New City to only $3 per claim. Duped by these misrepresentations, Blue Cross overpaid New City a total of $585; Blue Cross passed these overcharges along to the Federal Government.
The Government became aware of Halper's actions and in April, 1985, it indicted him on 65 counts of violating the criminal false-claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287, which prohibits "make[ing] or present[ing] . . . any claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent." Halper was convicted on all 65 counts, as well as on 16 counts of mail fraud. He was sentenced in July, 1985, to imprisonment for two years and fined $5,000.
The Government then brought the present action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Halper . . . under the civil False Claims Act (Act) . . . That Act was violated when "[a] person not a member of an armed force of the United States . . . (2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved." . . . Based on facts established by Halper's criminal conviction and incorporated in the civil suit, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Government on the issue of liability.
The court then turned its attention to the remedy for Halper's multiple violations. The remedial provision of the Act stated that a person in violation is "liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action." . . . Having violated the Act 65 separate times, Halper thus appeared to be subject to a statutory penalty of more than $130,000.
The District Court, however, concluded that, in light of Halper's previous criminal punishment, an additional penalty this large would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although the court recognized that the statutory provisions for a civil sanction of $2,000 plus double damages for a claims violation was not, in itself, criminal punishment, it concluded that this civil remedy, designed to make the Government whole, would constitute a second punishment for double jeopardy analysis if, in application, the amount of the penalty was "entirely unrelated" to the actual damages suffered and the expenses incurred by the Government. 660 F.Supp. at 533. In the District Court's view, the authorized recovery of more than $130,000 bore no "rational relation" to the sum of the Government's $585 actual loss plus its costs in investigating and prosecuting Halper's false claims. . . . The court therefore ruled that imposition of the full amount would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by punishing Halper a second time for the same conduct. To avoid this constitutional proscription, the District Court . . . limit[ed] the Government's recovery to double damages of $1,170 and the costs of the civil action.
The United States . . . took a direct appeal to this Court. . . .
This Court many times has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. . . . The third of these protections -- the one at issue here -- has deep roots in our history and jurisprudence. . . .
The multiple punishment issue before us is narrowly framed by the common understandings of the parties to this case. They do not dispute that respondent Halper already has been punished as a result of his prior criminal proceeding when he was sentenced to a jail term and fined $5,000. Nor do they dispute that the instant proceeding and the prior criminal proceeding concern the same conduct, the submission of 65 false claims. The sole question here is whether the statutory penalty authorized by the civil False Claims Act, under which Halper is subject to liability of $130,000 for false claims amounting to $585, constitutes a second "punishment" for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
The Government argues that in three previous cases . . . this Court foreclosed any argument that a penalty assessed in a civil proceeding, and specifically in a civil False Claims Act proceeding, may give rise to double jeopardy. . . . The Government, in our view, . . . has overread the holdings of our precedents. Although, taken together, these cases establish that proceedings and penalties under the civil False Claims Act are indeed civil in nature, and that a civil remedy does not rise to the level of "punishment" merely because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government's actual damages, they do not foreclose the possibility that, in a particular case, a civil penalty authorized by the Act may be so extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment. . . .
The relevant teaching of these cases is that the Government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. These cases do not tell us, because the problem was not presented in them, what the Constitution commands when one of those imprecise formulas authorizes a supposedly remedial sanction that does not remotely approximate the Government's damages and actual costs, and rough justice becomes clear injustice. . . .
We turn . . . to the unresolved question implicit in our cases: whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. As noted above, the Government takes the position that punishment in the relevant sense is meted out only in criminal proceedings, and that whether proceedings are criminal or civil is a matter of statutory construction. The Government correctly observes that this Court has followed this abstract approach when determining whether the procedural protections of the Sixth Amendment apply to proceedings under a given statute, in affixing the appropriate standard of proof for such proceedings, and in determining whether double jeopardy protections should be applied. . . . But while recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is appropriate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany those proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well suited to the context of the "humane interests" safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishments. . . . This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state.
In making this assessment, the labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties. The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and, for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads. Cf. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U. S. 624, 485 U. S. 631 (1988) ("[T]he labels affixed either to the proceeding or to the relief imposed . . . are not controlling, and will not be allowed to defeat the applicable protections of federal constitutional law"). To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.
These goals are familiar. We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 372 U. S. 168 (1963) (these are the "traditional aims of punishment"). Furthermore, "[r]etribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 441 U. S. 539, n. 20 (1979). From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. Cf. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 169 (whether sanction appears excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose is relevant to determination whether sanction is civil or criminal). We therefore hold that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.We acknowledge that this inquiry will not be an exact pursuit. In our decided cases, we have noted that the precise amount of the Government's damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. . . . Similarly, it would be difficult, if not impossible in many cases, for a court to determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment. In other words, as we have observed above, the process of affixing a sanction that compensates the Government for all its costs inevitably involves an element of rough justice. Our upholding reasonable liquidated damages clauses reflects this unavoidable imprecision. Similarly, we have recognized that, in the ordinary case, fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages provisions can be said to do no more than make the Government whole.
We cast no shadow on these time-honored judgments. What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused. The rule is one of reason: where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment.
We do not consider our ruling far-reaching or disruptive of the Government's need to combat fraud. Nothing in today's ruling precludes the Government from seeking the full civil penalty against a defendant who previously has not been punished for the same conduct, even if the civil sanction imposed is punitive. In such a case, the Double Jeopardy Clause simply is not implicated. Nor does the decision prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding. In a single proceeding, the multiple punishment issue would be limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature. . . . Finally, nothing in today's opinion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties. In other words, the only proscription established by our ruling is that the Government may not criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the Government whole. . . .
Returning to the case at hand, the District Court found a "tremendous disparity" between the Government's actual damages and the civil penalty authorized by the Act. . . . The court approximated the Government's expenses at no more than $16,000, as compared to the asserted liability of Halper in excess of $130,000. . . . Although the Government apparently did not challenge the District Court's figure -- choosing instead to litigate the legal issue we now decide -- we think it unfair to deprive the Government of an opportunity to present to the District Court an accounting of its actual costs arising from Halper's fraud, to seek an adjustment of the District Court's approximation, and to recover its demonstrated costs. While we agree with the District Court that the disparity between its approximation of the Government's costs and Halper's $130,000 liability is sufficiently disproportionate that the sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of double jeopardy, we remand the case to permit the Government to demonstrate that the District Court's assessment of its injuries was erroneous.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.